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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion

for five days notice prior to an order to show cause hearing?
II.

Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion

to close and clear the case for lack of jurisdiction?

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) 1953 as amended, and Utah Code
Annotated Section 77-35-26(2)(b) 1953 as amended whereby a defendant
in a criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of
the defendant.

In this case, the order was issued by the Honorable

Judge Sheila K. McCleve, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake Department,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Case No. 890174-CA
Priority #2

CHARLES W. FOLTZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an Order denying defendant's Motions
for five days notice prior to an order to show cause hearing and to
terminate probation on the underlying offense of Driving Under the
Influence.

The Motions were heard on February 24, 1989, before

Judge Sheila K. McCleve, in the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake
Department.

The Court revoked and reinstated probation for four

months and the defendant was ordered to pay all fines and fees in
full by May 24, 1989. A Certificate of Probable Cause was issued by
Judge Sheila K. McCleve on March 28, 1989.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 30, 1987, Mr. Charles w. Foltz, Jr., pleaded
guilty to Driving Under the Influence, a Class B misdemeanor.

On

April 20, 1987, Judge Robert C. Gibson sentenced Mr. Foltz to six
(6) months jail, suspending all but ten days.

He placed Mr. Foltz

on one (1) year probation to Alcohol Counseling and Education Center
(A.C.E.C.)

Conditions of the one (1) year probation were that

Mr. Foltz:

1) live rules and regulations;

3) attend A.C.E.C. classes;

2) stay out of trouble;

4) pay fine, fees and costs and

restitution ($600.00 fine, $150.00 fee, $100.00 Victim Restitution
Fund, and $250.00 - attorney fee);

5) serve ten (10) days jail work

release.
A warrant was ordered on the defendant on December 7, 1987;
an Order to Show Cause hearing was held February 25, 1988 after
Mr. Foltz was booked into jail.

Probation was revoked and

reinstated for one year on February 25, 1988.
On February 23, 1989, a court review was set; defendant was
present and an Order to Show Cause hearing was set for the next day,
February 24, 1989. On February 24, 1989, defendant's motion to
clear and close the case for lack of jurisdiction was denied and the
defendant's motion to be given 5 days notice prior to an Order to
Show Cause hearing was denied.

The defendant admitted allegations

that fines, fees and restitution were not paid in full, probation
was revoked and reinstated for four months and the defendant was
ordered to pay all fines and fees in full by May 24, 1989. The
defendant appeals those decisions.

-2 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for
five days notice prior to an Order to Show Cause hearing.

Denial of

the five days notice violated Mr. Foltz's rights to due process. If
it were not for this violation, the defendant's probation, even
under the trial court's view of probation, would have terminated
prior to the defendant's order to show cause hearing.
The trial court further erred in denying defendant's motion
to close and clear the case for lack of jurisdiction which
jurisdiction terminated by operation of law six (6) months after the
sentencing of Mr. Foltz.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR FIVE DAYS NOTICE PRIOR TO AN
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING.
§77-18-1(9)(c) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) states:
(c) The order to show cause shall specify
a time and place for the hearing, and
shall be served upon the defendant at
least five days prior to the hearing. The
defendant shall show good cause for a
continuance. The order to show cause
shall inform the defendant of a right to
be represented by counsel at the hearing
and to have counsel appointed for him if
he is indigent. The order shall also
inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
-3 -

This requirement of five days notice is consistent with a
defendant's right to due process of law under Art. I §7 of the
Constitution of Utah, Art. I §12 of the Constitution of Utah and
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States.
At his Order to Show Cause hearing of February 24, 1989,
Mr. Foltz, through his attorney, motioned the trial court that it
comply with the provisions of Utah Code §77-18-1(9)(c)(1987 Supp.)
and provide the defendant five (5) days notice prior to the hearing
(T 4, 5, and 6 of the Order to Show Cause Hearing of February 24,
1989.)

That motion was denied (Ibid. T 6).
The harmfulness of this error is analyzed under the

standard provided by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.

(Utah R.

Crim. P. 30 (a)(codified at Utah Code Ann. §77-35-30(a)(1982)). An
error in a criminal prosecution requires reversal when, absent the
error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable
to the accused, State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-21 (Utah 1987).
Had Mr. Foltz's motion for five days notice been granted,
the outcome at the order to show cause hearing would likely have
been different.

The Court's jurisdiction over Mr. Foltz would have

been even more tenuous. Under the Court's understanding of
probation, Mr. Foltz's probation absent a hearing and revocation
would have expired February 25, 1989.

Had Mr. Foltz been granted

his five days notice, the soonest the hearing could have been held
was March 1, 1989.

-4 -

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CLOSE AND CLEAR
MR, FOLTZ'S CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
The defendant's probation terminated upon operation of law
six (6) months after sentencing on a Class B misdemeanor.
Ann. §77-18-1(7)(a)(Supp. 1987)(See Addendum).
P.2d 462 (Utah 1988);

Utah Code

State v. Green, 757

State v. Penney, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah

App. 1989).
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(7)(a)(1987 Supp.)(See Addendum)
states:

"Upon completion of . . . six months [probation] in Class B

misdemeanor cases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless
earlier terminated by the court".
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462
(Utah 1988) held that a court lacks the jurisdiction to revoke a
defendant's probation if revocation proceedings are not initiated
before the expiration of the probationary term.
Mr. Foltz's probation expired by operation of law October
20, 1987. That was four months before any order to show cause
hearing was had by the court.

-5 -

CONCLUSION
On the above grounds, Appellant seeks reversal of the lower
court's order.

Appellant requests that this court find that the

lower court has no jurisdiction over the defendant as his probation
has been terminated by operation of law.

1-j

Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1989.
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UTAH CODE
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REPLACEMENT VOLUME 8C
1982 EDITION
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CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Confidential — Terms — Restitution
— Extension or revocation —
Hearings.

77-18-L

Section
77-18-2.

Expungement and sealing of
records.
77-18-5 5. Judgment of death — Defendant to
select firing squad or lethal mjection.
77-18-6. Judgment to pay fine or restitution
constitutes a lien.

Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Confidential
— Terms — Restitution — Extension or revocation — Hearings.

(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation. Supervised probation by the department may not be imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or
infractions. The jurisdiction of all probationers referred to the Department of Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is
with the Department of Corrections.
(b) The legal custody of all probationers not referred to the department
is vested as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant. The
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level
of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment
prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections.
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department
standards.
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or information from other
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of
25
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restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential and
not available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the
Judicial Council and for use by the Department of Corrections. At the time of
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or
the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on
record and in the presence of the defendant.
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
and
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201 (3) and (4).
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines
and restitution during the probation period in cases where the court orders
supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice
of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order
on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The
order is considered a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil
remedy.
(7) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months' probation in felony
or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor
cases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated
by the court.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court
and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in all cases where
termination of supervision will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a minimum
of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and
hearing by the probationer, the court may extend probation for an additional term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months
in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing.
(8) (a) All time served without violation while on probation applies to service of the total term of probation but does not eliminate the requirement
of serving 18 consecutive months without violation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in class
B misdemeanor cases. Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing
26
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to revoke the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute
service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is
exonerated at the hearing.
(b) When any probationer, without authority from the court or the
Department of Corrections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or
evades probation supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion
tolls the probation period.
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a probationer at any time, at the discretion of the court.
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (7)(c) of this chapter [section], probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing
by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation Probation may not
be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified If the court determines that there is probable
cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or expended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to
present evidence.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting'attorney shall present evidence on the allegations The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a finding
that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may
order the probation revoked, modified, [or] continued, or that the entire
probation term commence anew If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U S C A 1985
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; L. 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982,
ch. 9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.

212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ L
Compiler's Notes. — The 1983 amendment
by chapter 47 made the former second and
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tions" for "Department of Adult Probation and
Parole" in Subsection (4), and made minor
changes in phraseology
The 1985 amendment by Chapter 229 substituted "Department" for "Division" throughout
the section, inserted "supervised" and 'lay the
Department of Corrections" in the first sentence and "referred to the Department of Corrections" in the second sentence of Subsection
(1), substituted "and the Department" for "of
the offender and the chief agent of the adult
probation and parole section of the Division"
near the end of the second sentence of Subsection (1), added the last sentence of Subsection
(1), deleted the designation (a) at the beginning of Subsection (4), inserted "or information
from other sources" in the first sentence of
Subsection (4), deleted 'the Department of before "Adult" in the second sentence of Subsection (4), deleted 'and the supervision of the Division of Corrections" after "sentence" in Subsection (10)(a), inserted "30 days in advance"
in Subsection (10)(b>, added Subsections (10)(c)
and (10)(d), inserted 'court or the" in Subsection (11 Kb), inserted the second sentence of
Subsection (13), deleted "civil" before "jurisdiction" in the next-to-last sentence of Subsection
(13), and made minor changes in phraseology
The 1987 amendment rewrote this section,
as last amended by Laws 1985, ch 229, § 1, to
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracticable
Separability Clause. — Section 3 of Laws
1983, ch 85 provided "If any provision of this
act, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application "
Cross-References. — Rules of Evidence inapplicable to sentencing and probation proceedings, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101
Sentencing for infractions, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-205, 76-3-301
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
76-3-204, 76-3-301

third sentences of present subsec (6) present
subsec (8), added present subsec <6)(f), and
made minor changes in phraseology, punctuation and style
The 1983 amendment by chapter 68 deleted
"provided, however, that the State of Utah
shall reimburse any county for the actual costs
of incarceration of a convicted felon sentenced
to serve in a county jail as a condition of probation" at the end of present subsec (6)(e)
The 1983 amendment by chapter 85 made
the former second and third sentences of
present subsec (6) present subsec (8), substituted "include as part of its written order" for
"state for the court record" in the second sentence of present subsec (8), inserted present
subsec (9), redesignated following subsections,
added former subsec (8), which was deleted in
1984, and present subsec (14) and made minor
changes in phraseology, punctuation and style
The 1984 amendment inserted "except in the
case of class C misdemeanors, for which probation may not be imposed, and" in the first sentence of subsec (1), added "unless otherwise
provided by law" to the first sentence of subsec
(1), deleted a sentence at the end of subsec (1)
which read "In cases that do not involve an
indeterminate sentence, the period of probation may exceed the length of time of the maximum sentence that could be imposed", inserted
subsecs (2) and (3), redesignated following
subsections, inserted "unless otherwise provided by law" in the first sentence of subsec
(6), inserted subsec (7), inserted subsecs (10)
and (11); deleted a former subsec (8) which
read "Restitution shall be imposed unless
upon a hearing in court a finding is made that
restitution is inappropriate pursuant to Subsection 76-3-201(3)(b) or the defendant objects
to its imposition pursuant to Subsection 76-3201(3)(c)", inserted subsec (13), and made
minor changes in phraseology and style
The 1985 amendment by Chapter 212 substituted "Department" for "Division" throughout
the section, substituted "adult probation and
parole section of the Department of CorrecANALYSIS

Disclosure of presentence report to defendant
Presentence reports
Restitution to insurance company
Disclosure of presentence report to defendant
Only when disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize the life or safety of third
parties should there be deletions from the report to protect them, in such cases, disclosure
to a defendant of as much of the report as possible should be made with identifying indicia of
i person who would be threatened excluded

from the report, sealed, and included in the
record on appeal, m all other cases, full disclosure of the report should be made State v
Casarez (Utah 1982) 656 P2d 1005
Presentence reports.
Fact that record did not substantiate that
defendant or his counsel viewed presentence
report did not amount to prejudicial error
where there was nothing to indicate that their

28
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opportunity to view the report was thwarted.
State v. Mitchell (Utah 1983) 671 P.2d 213.
Where information as to defendant's sexual
misconduct was reliable and he was given ade~
quate notice of the allegations and defendant
did not attempt to call the victim and cross-examine her or take the stand himself, the court
was justified in relying on evidence of defendant's sexual misconduct in sentencing defendant for burglary. State v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746
(Utah 1986).
Restitution to insurance company.
The court did not exceed its authority in ordering the defendant, convicted of committing
arson upon his house, to reimburse insurance

77-18-2

companies for their loss in compensating the
bank which acquired the house through foreclosure. State v. Stayer (Utah 1985) 706 P.2d
611.
Law Reviews. — Testing the Limits of the
Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction in Fraud Cases:
Discharge v. Criminal Restitution, 1984
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 61.
A.L.R. — Probation officer's liability for
negligent supervision of probationer, 44
A.L.R.4th 638.
Admissibility of expert testimony as to appropnate punishment for convicted defendant.
47 A.L.R.4th 1069.
Appealability of order suspending imposition
or execution of sentence, 51 A.L.R. 4th 939.

77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of records.
(1) (a) A person convicted of any crime, except a capital felony, first degree
felony, or second degree forcible felony as defined in Subsection
76-2-402(3), within this state may petition the convicting court for an
expungement and for sealing of his record in that court The person shall
file both the petition and a certificate issued by the Utah Bureau of
Criminal Identification indicating that there is no record with the bureau
of an expungement regarding the petitioner. Both documents shall be
served upon the prosecuting attorney. The court shall then set a date for a
hearing and notify the prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction of the
date set for hearing. Persons having relevant information about the petitioner may testify at the hearing, and the court in its discretion may
request a written evaluation by the adult parole and probation section of
the Department of Corrections.
(b) A person who at the time of petition for expungement has two or
more convictions for any type of felony offense on his record, not arising
out of a single criminal episode, or whose felony criminal record has been
previously expunged, is not eligible for expungement of any of those offenses regardless of type or degree of offense.
(c) The court shall enter an order that all records in petitioner's case in
the custody of that court or in the custody of any other court, agency, or
official be sealed if the court finds: *
(i) the petitioner has not been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor for a period of seven years in the case of a felony, six years in
the case of an alcohol-related traffic offense under Title 41, or for a
period of five years in the case of a class A misdemeanor, or for a
period of three years in the case of all other misdemeanors or an
infraction under Title 76, after his release from incarceration, parole,
or probation, whichever occurs last;
(ii) that no proceeding involving a crime is pending or being instituted against the petitioner; and
(iii) the petitioner has presented to the court a certificate issued by
the Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification as described in Subsection QXa).
(d) The court shall issue to the petitioner a certificate stating the
court's finding that he has satisfied the court of his compliance with the
statutory requirements for expungement.
29
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Terry Vernon GREEN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No, 870137.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 14, 1988.
Defendant appealed from order of the
Second District Court, Davis County, Douglas L. Cornaby, J., revoking his probation.
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that
trial court did not have authority to revoke
defendant's probation after defendant's
probationary period had expired by operation of statute.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Criminal Law <s»1208.2, 1208.3(1)
Judges may exercise sentencing discretion within those limits established by legislature; power to fix sentencing limits and
power to suspend sentence in favor of probation are not inherent in judiciary but
must be authorized by statute.
2. Criminal Law <s=>982.9
Power to revoke probation must be
exercised within legislatively established
limits.
3. Constitutional Law <£=>52
Criminal Law <£»978
Statute providing for automatic termination of probation after 18 months with no
probation violations is not unconstitutional
limitation on sentencing power of judiciary.
U.C.A.1953, 77-18-l(10)(a) (1984).
4. Criminal Law <*=>982.7
Trial court did not have authority to
revoke defendant's probation after defendant's probationary period had expired by
operation of statute providing for automatic termination of probation after 18 months
with no probation violations, although
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 was amended in
1985 and 1987. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 229.
§ 1; 1987 Utah Laws ch. 114, § 1. The provi-

court determined that violation occurred
during probationary period. U.C.A.1953,
77-18-l(10)(a) (1984).
Dale E. Stratford, Ogden, for defendant
and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, David B. Thompson,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
DURHAM, Justice:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's
revocation of his probation. He claims that
his probation term had already been terminated by operation of law pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp.1984),1
which provides for automatic termination
of probation after eighteen months with no
probation violations, and that the trial
court lacked authority to revoke probation
after the expiration of the statutory period.
Defendant pleaded guilty on February 7,
1984, to a charge of issuing bad checks
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1978).
He was sentenced by the trial court on May
29, 1984, to an indeterminate term of zero
to five years in the Utah State Prison, fined
$1,500, and ordered to pay restitution. The
court suspended the prison term and the
fine and placed defendant on probation.
Defendant agreed as one condition of probation that he would not violate federal,
state, or local laws.
Defendant's case was reviewed several
times by the court On one of these occasions, February 18, 1986, an Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P) officer reported
that Afeiferafctfrt, \a& \xxzi thaxg^A w t h two
counts of sodomy on a child and one count
of attempted rape of a child. All of these
offenses were alleged to have been committed during April, May, and June 1985, a
time period within the eighteen-month statutory term of defendant's probation. Defendant was convicted of all three offenses
on June 26, 1986.
AP & P filed an affidavit of probation
violation with the court on August 5, 1986.
Because the court was informed that desions defendant relies upon in his challenge are
currently found
in Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp.1987).
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fendant had appealed the June convictions,
the probation violation matter was continued to permit the appeal to be decided. No
order respecting the status of defendant's
probation was entered. On February 3,
1987, the court determined that defendant
had not filed an appeal from the convictions and found defendant in violation of
his probation. Defendant requested a
hearing on disposition. Before the scheduled date of the hearing, he petitioned this
Court for a writ of prohibition in order to
halt the lower court's sentencing hearing.
We denied the writ On March 25, 1987,
the trial court held that Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp.1984) was
an unconstitutional limitation on the sentencing power of judges. On March 31,
1987, defendant was ordered to serve the
term of zero to five years originally imposed upon him for the bad check conviction. A certificate of probable cause was
issued, and this appeal followed.
Neither defendant nor the State claims
on appeal that the lower court was correct
in holding that Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) is unconstitutional. Both
agree that this holding was unnecessarily
broad. However, the State argues that the
statute does not automatically terminate
probation—and therefore does not automatically terminate a judge's continuing
jurisdiction over a defendant—unless a defendant commits no probation violations
within the eighteen-month statutory term.
The State argues for an interpretation of
the statute that would allow a trial court to
revoke probation after the expiration of the
eighteen-month period upon discovery that
a parole violation occurred during that period. This interpretation, the State claims,
furthers the purpose of probation because,
regardless of when a violation becomes
known to the State, the defendant has violated the terms of his probation and the
public trust associated with probation.
Defendant argues not only that the statute is constitutional, but also that probation terminates by operation of law eighteen months after it is ordered if no probation violations have been reported to the
court Unless the court acts to revoke
probation or extend the term of probation

for another eighteen months, according to
defendant, it loses jurisdiction over a defendant and cannot order execution of the
underlying sentence upon discovery of a
prior probation violation.
This Court has previously held that while
courts possess judicial discretion in the sentencing of defendants, the power to define
crimes and fix the punishment for those
crimes is vested in the legislature. In
State v. Bishop, 111 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986),
we held that the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme adopted by the legislature
for child sexual abuse crimes was constitutional The defendant in Bishop claimed
that Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (Supp.
1987) infringed upon the separation of powers provision in the Utah Constitution because it left no power in judges to suspend
sentences in favor of probation. In rejecting this contention, we examined the history of judicial sentencing power and determined that at common law and after statehood, the legislative branch possessed the
power to fix punishment for crimes, as long
as the punishment was not cruel or unusual. Id at 263-64.
[1-3] In Bishop, 717 P.2d at 264, we
cited with approval language from Mutart
v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67 (1917), an
early Utah case. In Mutart, this Court
stated:
That the Legislature of this state has the
sole power to fix punishment to be inflicted for a particular crime, with the
limitation only that it be not cruel or
excessive, will not be questioned. That it
may fix any punishment subject to the
above limitation, and leave no discretion
whatever in the courts as to the extent or
degree of punishment is a well-recognized and universally accepted doctrine,
and under a statute fixing a definite period the court has no more discretion as to
the punishment than the police officer
whose duty it is to carry the punishment
into effect
The right of the court to
inflict any punishment at all is given it
by the Legislature, and without some act
on the part of the lawmaking power no
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such power or duty would be vested
therein
51 Utah at 250, 170 P. at 68. In accord
with this principle, we reaffirm that judges
may exercise sentencing discretion within
those limits established by the legislature;
the power to fix sentencing limits and the
power to suspend sentence in favor of probation are not inherent in the judiciary but
must be authorized by statute. Similarly,
the power to revoke probation must be
exercised within legislatively established
limits. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)
(Interim Supp.1984) is therefore not an unconstitutional limitation on the sentencing
power of the judiciary.
14] In light of the limits of judicial sentencing power, we examine the statute to
determine if the trial court exceeded its
authority in revoking defendant's probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 sets forth
probation procedures in general. At the
time this matter arose, section 77-18l(10Xa) stated:
Upon completion without violation of 18
months probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, cr six months in
class B misdemeanor cases, the offender
shall be terminated from sentence and
the supervision of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier terminated by the court
(Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(10Xa) (Interim Supp.1984).2 The
statute requires that the offender "shall"
be terminated from sentence if eighteenmonths' probation is completed without violation. This strong mandate is not consistent with the State's position that the eighteen-month term is "tolled" when any violation occurs within the period and that there
2. The statute currently states:
(7)(a) Upon completion without violation of
18 months' probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B
misdemeanor cases, the probation period
shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated
by the court
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in ail
cases where termination of supervision will
occur by law. The notification shall include a
probation progress report and complete re-

is no time limit for initiating a revocation
action.
The State's interpretation of the statute
would create absurd results. Defendants
would be left in a perpetual state of limbo;
although their probation would appear to
have been terminated, usually by entry of
an order to that effect, defendants would
actually be subject to a continued term of
fictional supervision. This indefinite probationary term could theoretically be revoked
many years after the original imposition
and suspension of sentence. Decades could
pass and then, based upon the discovery of
a probation violation which had occurred
during the statutory period, a court could
revoke a term of probation thought to have
been terminated long ago. This construction would obviate the certainty and regularity created by the statute and ignore the
plain meaning of the word "terminate.,,
In In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531
(1903), this Court examined a trial court's
jurisdictional limits after the trial court had
indefinitely suspended a defendant's sentence and discharged him from custody.
This Court stated: "[W]e know of no rule
or principle of law whereby a court can
indefinitely suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of suspense and uncertainty, and, long after he has been discharged from custody, have him rearrested, and impose a sentence of either fine or
imprisonment on him." IcL at 341, 71 P. at
531-32. We believe the same principle defeats the State's arguments regarding section 77-18-l(10)(a).
Many other states have addressed a
question analogous to the one raised in this
case, i.e., whether a trial court lacks jurisdiction to revoke or amend probation after
port of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
(c) At any time prior to the termination of
probation, upon a minimum of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the
notice and hearing by the probationer, the
court may extend probation for an additional
term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) to (c) (Supp.
1987).
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judicially invoked probationary period
ires. In State v. Gibson, 156 NJ.Su. 516, 384 A.2d 178 (1978), the New
sey Superior Court characterized the rets reached by the courts of other states
follows: (1) probation may be revoked if
> proceedings are initiated within a realable time after the probationary term's
piration; (2) probation may be revoked if
i proceedings are initiated within the
>bationary term;3 and (3) probation may
revoked only if the proceedings are cometed within the probationary term. Id. at
9-30, 384 A.2d at 184-85. None of these
proaches has been used by a clear majorr of jurisdictions, and each appears to be
rgely a function of the statutory lantage of each state.
The State argues that terminating the
>urt's jurisdiction simultaneously with the
robation period will frustrate the public
jlicy underlying probation, because a probationer who commits a violation has ig«
wed the obligations set forth in the probaon agreement, has violated the trust assorted with probation, and has endangered
tie public. We agree that these concerns
re valid; however, all but technical violaions can be punished on their own merits,
tnd the defendant's past record can be
.considered at that time.
Moreover, the current amended version
>f section 77-18-1 does allow judges to
*void some of the problems that may arise
under a fixed period of jurisdiction. Pursuant to section 77-18-l(7)(c), a "court may
extend probation for an additional term . . .
if fines or restitution or both are owing."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(c) (Supp.
1987). In the instant case, for example,
defendant had not yet completed paying all
of the restitution that he was ordered to
pay, and under the current law, the trial
court could have continued its jurisdiction
over defendant for another eighteen-month
term.4
3. Because the revocation proceedings in this
case were not initiated until after the statutory
probation term had expired, we need not reach
the issue of the retention of jurisdiction when
proceedings have been initiated but not completed within the eighteen-month term.

The trial court may also hold a hearing
within the eighteen-month period, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (Supp.
1987), to determine whether a defendant
has violated the terms of his or her probation. If the court determines that probation violations have in fact occurred, probation may be "revoked, modified, [or] continued, or . . . the entire probation term [may]
commence anew/'
Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(9Xe) (Supp.1987).
The trial court's order revoking probation and authorizing execution of defendant's sentence is reversed. The case is
remanded for entry of an order terminating
custody.
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate C.J.,
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.
(p
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Mitchell D. HENDERSON, Eileen Buttars, Laurena B. Henderson, and David
Hale, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
FOR-SHOR COMPANY, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870502-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 10, 1988.
Owner of cement forms brought action
for conversion based on their wrongful repossession. Owner's grandmother, on
whose land forms had been stored, brought
claim for trespass. Lessee of the forms
brought suit for rental overcharge. The
1st District Court, Cache County, Venoy
4. Under the statute in effect at the time of
defendant's probation period, the trial court was
not specifically empowered to do so.
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in Breitling, is present here. The County
will raise no revenue from the curbs and
gutters, nor will it acquire a building with
intrinsic value. Instead, it will incur the
expenses of cleaning and maintaining curbs
and gutters with no resale value or intrinsic economic worth.
[4] Further, we think that the circumstances are such that it is not inequitable
for Salt Lake County to retain whatever
benefit it may have received from the materials delivered by Concrete Products. Indeed, the result argued for by Concrete
Products would be inequitable, in that it
would turn the taxpayers of Salt Lake
County into guarantors for all materialmen
working on private developments and
would subvert the intent of county ordinances requiring developers to guarantee
completion of improvements by shifting the
burden of providing improvements from developers to taxpayers.
In short, we can find no reason why the
law should imply a promise on the part of
Salt Lake County to pay Concrete Products
for materials it delivered to a third party.
Because we find for Salt Lake County on
the substantive issues, we do not address
Salt Lake County's claim that Concrete
Products has not complied with the Governmental Immunity Act.
Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Costs to appellant.
(O

ing one of her normal daily tasks of lifting
computer from floor level up to conveyor
belt, applied for workers' compensation
benefits. The Industrial Commission denied benefits. Worker appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that injury of worker was compensable accident
Reversed and remanded.

Workers' Compensation <s=>569
Injury of worker, who felt snap and
tingling pain in her lower back as she was
performing one of her normal daily tasks
of lifting computer from floor level up to
conveyor belt, was "accident/' for purposes
of statute awarding compensation to employees injured by "accident" arising out of
or in the course of their employment U.C.
A.1953, 35-1-45.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Denton M. Hatch, Wesley M. Lang, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Second Injury Fund.
Thomas Kay, Steven J. Aeschbacher, Salt
Lake City, for Sperry Corp. and Travelers
Ins. Co.
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G. Carmen HERRERA, Plaintiff,
v.
SPERRY CORPORATION, Travelers Insurance Company, Second Injury Fund,
and Industrial Commission of Utah,
Defendants.
No. 860062.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 17, 1987.
Worker, who felt snap and tingling
pain in her lower back as she was perform-

Steven M. Hadley, Salt Lake City, for
Indus. Com'n.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
This case is an appeal from an Industrial
Commission ruling that an injury suffered
by G. Carmen Herrera was not a compensable accident We reverse.
Herrera was performing one of her normal daily tasks of lifting a computer from
floor level up to a conveyor belt when she
felt a snap and a tingling pain in her lower
back. As a result of this injury, Herrera
was unable to work for several months.
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She applied for compensation under section
3S-1-45 of the Code, U.C.A., 1953, § 35-145 (1974 ed., Supp.1986), which states:
"Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by
accident arising out of or in the course of
his employment . . . shall be paid . . . compensation— "
The Industrial Commission of Utah ruled
that the injury was not an "accident" because Herrera suffered her injury while
performing her usual daily tasks in the
usual manner. Herrera appeals the decision of the Industrial Commission. She
contends that unexpected injuries incurred
while performing one's usual duties are
compensable "accidents" if there is a causal connection between the injury and the
worker's employment duties.
After this appeal was argued, we decided
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d
15 (Utah 1986). There, we held that "an
accident is an unexpected or unintended
occurrence that may be either the cause or
the result of an injury." Id. at 22 (emphasis in original). Under this definition,
Herrera's injury was an "accident"
Whether she is entitled to compensation
depends on her satisfying the other elements set out in Allen. We reverse and
remand for further considenition in light of
Allen.
HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate
CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, JJ.,
concur.
(o
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The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Johnnie Patrick KNIGHT, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 20670.
Supreme Court of Utah.

Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J.,
and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that prosecution's failure
to comply with discovery agreement by omitting correct addresses and telephone numbers of two potential witnesses and statements taken from those witnesses was
prejudicial error.
Reversed.

1. Criminal Law e=>627.8(3)
Failure to properly request a court order for criminal discovery of items falling
within catchall provision of discovery statute could be fatal to claim based on nondisclosure of evidence. U.C.A.1953, 77-3516(aX5).
2. Criminal Law <s=>627.8(l, 6)
When prosecution responds voluntarily
to request for discovery, prosecution either
must produce all the materials requested or
identify explicitly those portions of the request with respect to which no responsive
material will be provided and must continue to disclose such material to the defense
on an ongoing basis. U.C.A.1953, 77-3516.
3. Criminal Law <s=>627.5(l)
If prosecution agrees to produce certain specified material and it later comes
into possession of additional material that
falls within that same specification, it has
to produce the later-acquired material.
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-16.
4. Criminal Law <£=>700(6)
Prosecutor's unconditional agreement
to produce statements in possession of any
member or group involved in prosecution
or investigation of case obliged him to
search beyond his own file cabinet and
determine whether others involved in prosecution had additional materials responsive
to the request

March 19, 1987.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery by a jury in the Third District
734 P 2d—21

5. Criminal Law <s=>627.8(6)
Prosecutor's good faith in complying
with unconditional agreement to produce
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materials sought by defense should not
have had any impact on trial court's determination of whether prosecutor violated his
discovery duties.

dence against defendant was not overwhelming, especially given codefendant's
acquittal.

6. Criminal Law <s=»1166(10.10)
For error in response to prosecutor's
violation of his discovery duties to require
reversal, likelihood of a different outcome
must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict, such that there was
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant but for the prosecution's violations of discovery duties.

Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Sandra
L. Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent

7. Criminal Law <S=>1163(1)
In cases involving wrongful failure to
disclose inculpatory evidence, State has the
burden of persuading the court that the
error did not unfairly prejudice the defense
and there was no reasonable likelihood
that, absent the error, the outcome of the
trial would have been more favorable for
the defendant.
8. Criminal Law <s=>1163(l)
In case involving wrongful failure to
disclose inculpatory evidence, State may
meet burden of persuading court that error
did not unfairly prejudice defendant by
showing that, despite errors, the outcome
of the trial merited confidence and that
there was no reasonable likelihood of more
favorable result for defendant.
9. Criminal Law 0=627.8(6), 629
The fact that defense counsel conducted vigorous cross-examination of two witnesses was not proof that she was fully
prepared to meet witnesses' testimony, for
purposes of determining whether defense
was prejudiced by State's failure to disclose addresses and telephone number of
witnesses and statements given by them to
prosecution.
10. Criminal
Law
<3»627.8(6), 629,
1166(10.10, 11)
Prosecution's failure to disclose addresses and telephone numbers of prospective witnesses pursuant to consent agreement and to disclose contents of statement
to police prejudiced defendant where testimony of those witnesses was pivotal to
defendant's conviction, and additional evi-

ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant Johnnie Patrick Knight appeals from a jury conviction on a charge of
aggravated robbery. Knight contends that
during discovery, the prosecution assumed
the obligation to provide defense counsel
with certain requested information, including the correct addresses and telephone
numbers of two potential witnesses and
statements taken from those witnesses by
an investigator. Knight complains that the
prosecutor did not fulfill this obligation and
that as a result, Knight's ability to defend
was impaired because the two witnesses
appeared at trial and gave unanticipated
testimony. Knight further argues that the
prejudice to his defense was not mitigated
as it should have been because the trial
court denied his motions for a continuance
or a mistrial. We agree and reverse the
conviction.
On February 2, 1984, the One Hour Martinizing Cleaners located at 1689 South
West Temple Street in Salt Lake City was
robbed of approximately $85.50. Two
masked men carrying weapons entered the
establishment through the employees' entrance, forced the manager to lie on the
floor, and compelled an employee to open
the cash register. After removing the
money from the till, the men took the manager's checkbook and wallet, cut the telephone cord, and fled.
The manager and the employee were not
able to describe the robbers' facial characteristics because the faces were almost entirely covered. However, the employee
was able to describe to investigators a man
who had entered the establishment shortly
before the robbery. The man stayed for
only a moment and glanced around the
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store while he asked for directions.
Through a police photo lineup, the employee identified this man as Jeff Richens.
Immediately after the robbery, a motorist saw the robbers running out of the One
Hour Martinizing Cleaners. The motorist
followed in his car as the men ran down the
middle of West Temple Street and then
down an alley to a getaway car with a
waiting driver. The motorist copied the
license number of the car and noticed that
the driver had long hair. The license number was turned over to police investigators
who quickly located the car, which was
parked on a roadside in West Valley City.
The car was registered to Kim Richens,
Jeff Richens' wife.
With Kim Richens' permission, investigators searched the car and found several
items linking the car to the robbery. In
the trunk of the car, they also found a
wallet belonging to Johnnie Knight, along
with some clothing, tools, and animal traps.
When police investigators questioned
Knight, he explained that he left his wallet
in the trunk after a trapping excursion
with Jeff Richens. Knight also stated that
at the time of the robbery, he was with
Georgia Moore, drinking coffee in her
kitchen. Upon questioning, Georgia Moore
corroborated Knight's story, and the wallet
was returned to its owner,
Jeff Richens also was interviewed. Richens admitted involvement in the robbery
and agreed to testify for the State. He
pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of attempted robbery. Richens' story was that
Johnnie Knight and Joseph Ridlon were the
two masked robbers who carried weapons
and that he was the driver of the car.
Knight and Ridlon were charged with
aggravated robbery. At trial, they were
co-defendants represented by separate
counsel Pursuant to Rule 16(aX5) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A.,
1953, § 77-35-16(a)(5) (1982 ed.), counsel
for Knight filed a written motion requesting that the trial court order the prosecution to disclose certain specified items and
information, including the addresses and
telephone numbers of the State's potential
witnesses and any statements taken from

them. A hearing on the motion was scheduled, but prior to the date of that hearing,
the prosecutor agreed to comply voluntarily with the discovery request. The trial
court cancelled the hearing and did not
issue a discovery order.
In preparing to respond to the discovery
request, the prosecutor assumed that all
information pertaining to the case was located in his files. As a result, he did not
check the files of other members of the
prosecution team, and when providing the
defense with the requested material, he did
not indicate that he had not checked others'
files.
The prosecutor's response listed Georgia
Moore and her estranged husband, Walter
Moore, among the witnesses the State intended to call. The prosecutor did not disclose that any statements had been taken
from the Moores. He did list addresses
and telephone numbers for the Moores, but
they were not current. A few days before
trial, defense counsel asked the prosecutor
whether he had discovered the Moores' current addresses and telephone numbers.
The prosecutor truthfully responded that
his subpoenas had been returned unserved
and that he had been unable to locate the
Moores. However, within a day or two the
prosecutor managed to contact the Moores
(one of whom was living out of the state)
and arranged for them to attend trial and
testify. As a result of this contact, the
prosecutor obtained correct addresses and
telephone numbers for the Moores. These
were not given to defense counsel prior to
trial
On the first day of the two-day trial,
defense counsel learned that an investigator for the State, Sergeant Adamson, had
taken statements from both of the Moores
months before trial and that the statements
had lain in Adamson's files ever since.
That evening, defense counsel obtained
copies of the statements. Their substance
was as follows:
(i) According to the statement given to
Adamson by Georgia Moore, Knight had
asked her to be his alibi for a robbery he
was accused of but did not commit, and
she had agreed. However, at the time of
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the interview with Adamson, Georgia
Moore said that she was tired of lying
and that Knight was not in her kitchen at
the time of the robbery.
(ii) According to Walter Moore's statement to Adamson, Knight telephoned
him shortly after the time of the robbery
and asked him to pick up Knight and a
friend because they were having car
trouble. Walter Moore picked up Knight
and Richens and the three then drove
past Richens' car (the getaway car),
which was parked on a roadside in West
Valley City.
At the opening of trial on the second day,
defense counsel made appropriate objections to the Moores' testifying, moved for
mistrial, requested a continuance, and attempted to withdraw as counsel. The trial
court denied all motions. Both Georgia
and Walter Moore were allowed to testify,
and defense counsel was not given any
additional time to meet the unanticipated
testimony. Knight was convicted of aggravated robbery, while co-defendant Ridlon
was acquitted.
This appeal presents two questions:
first, whether the State's failure to disclose
the Moores' statements, addresses, and
telephone numbers was error; second, if
error was committed, whether defendant
suffered prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal.
The starting place for analyzing the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct is defendant's motion to discover. That motion
sought, inter alia, the following:
A. A list of ail the witnesses that the
State intends to call for trial in the
above-entitled matter, their addresses
and telephone numbers;
B. Any recordings, reports, transcripts, or reports about statements in
possession of any member, or group involved in the prosecution or the investigation of the above-entitled case taken
from the witnesses listed in point [A]
above.

The prosecutor's obligation to comply
with this request for discovery must be
evaluated under Rule 16 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which states in pertinent part
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense
upon request the following material or
information of which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the
defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense
for reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which
the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the
defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16 (1982 ed.) (emphasis added).
[1-3] Where, as here, the requested material is not covered by the detailed descriptions in subsections (a)(1) through (aX4),
which mandate disclosure upon request,
subsection (a)(5), the catch-all provision, applies. It requires disclosure of the material
sought only to the extent ordered by the
trial court.1 However, when the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily to a
request under subsection (a)(5) without requiring the defense to obtain a court order,
considerations of fairness require that the
prosecution respond to the request in a
manner that will not be misleading. Therefore, we articulate two requirements that
the prosecution must meet when it responds voluntarily to a request for discovery. First, the prosecution either must
produce all of the material requested or
must identify explicitly those portions of
the request with respect to which no re-

1. Failure to properly request a court order under section 77-35-16(a)(5) may be fatal to a
claim based on the nondisclosure of evidence.
See State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342. 346 (Utah

1985); cf. State v. Workman, 635 P.2d 49. 53
(Utah 1981) (failure to exercise reasonable diligence in conducting discovery tends to negate a
claim that nondisclosure was erroneous).
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sponsive material will be provided. Sec- 3384-85; see, e.g., State v. Fierst, 692 P.2d
ond, when the prosecution agrees to pro- 751, 752 (Utah 1984); cf. State v. Booker,
duce any of the material requested, it must 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985). The request
continue to disclose such material on an in the present case specifically and unmisongoing basis to the defense. Therefore, if takably sought disclosure of subsection
the prosecution agrees to produce certain (a)(5) material consisting of the names and
specified material and it later comes into addresses of witnesses and their statepossession of additional material that falls ments. The prosecution clearly understood
within that same specification, it has to what was requested and agreed to provide
produce the later-acquired material.2
all that it had.
Some discussion of the rationale behind
The second requirement—that there be a
these two requirements is warranted. continuing obligation to disclose material
With respect to the first—that the govern- falling within the scope of the agreement
ment produce everything requested or iden- to produce—is not a novel requirement, but
tify the material not being provided—the is a specific application of a burden we
observations of the United States Supreme imposed on the government in State v.
Court in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). There,
667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), we observed that a prosecutor has a conare instructive, although they dealt with tinuing obligation to reveal newly discoverneither the type of evidence involved in this ed evidence that fits within the scope of
case nor Utah's discovery statute0
prior disclosures. This obligation was imThe Government notes that an incom- posed to make criminal discovery a fair
plete response to a specific request not process. In Carter, we stated:
only deprives the defense of certain eviTo meet basic standards of fairness and
dence, but has the effect of representing
to insure that a trial is a real quest for
to the defense that the evidence does not
truth and not simply a contest between
exist In reliance on this misleading repthe parties to win, a defendant's request
resentation, the defense might abandon
for information which has been voluntarlines of independent investigation, deily complied with, or a court order of
fenses, or trial strategies that it otherdiscovery must be deemed to be a conwise would have pursued.
tinuing request. And even though there
We agree that the prosecutor's failure
is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecuto respond fully to a . . . request may
tor's failure to disclose newly discovered
impair the adversary process in this maninculpatory information which falls
ner.
with[in] the ambit of § 77-35-16(a), after
Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3384 (citation omitthe prosecution has made a voluntary
ted).
disclosure of evidence might so mislead
For the misleading-the-defense rationale
defendant as to cause prejudicial error.
to apply, the discovery request must be
3
sufficiently specific to permit the prosecu- Id. at 662.
[4,5] In the present case, the prosecution to understand what is sought and to
justify the parallel assumption on the part tor's conduct plainly did not satisfy either
of the defense that material not produced of the two requirements set forth above.
does not exist. Id. at 682-83, 105 S.Ct. at First, he did not notify defense counsel of
2. Absent such a requirement, defense counsel
would have to submit frequent requests to the
prosecution to be sure that all pertinent material had been produced. No practical purpose
would be served by imposing such a burden-some requirement on the defense. Moreover,
great potential for game-playing between the
prosecution and the defense is inherent in a
discovery system that lacks a continuing obligation to disclose.

3. The requirements imposed in Carter and the
present case not only ensure that a trial is a real
quest for truth, but also should increase confidence in informal discovery procedures by making the obligations of the parties more certain
and thereby should reduce the need for courtordered discovery in an already-burdened criminal justice system.
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the limited nature of his response to the
request for production. The defense requested "statements in possession of any
member, or group involved in the prosecution or the investigation of the above-entitled case.'1 The prosecutor agreed to provide the materials sought, but he furnished
only the information found in his own files.
He did not determine whether others "involved in the prosecution or the investigation" of the case had additional materials
responsive to the request Given the explicit language of the request, there is no
question that the prosecutor's unconditional agreement to produce obliged him to
search beyond his own file cabinet.4 He
did not do so, and he did not inform defense counsel of that fact.5
The second requirement also was violated because the prosecutor did not provide
defense counsel with after-acquired information responsive to the request, specifically, the current addresses and telephone
numbers of the Moores.
Having determined that the prosecutor
violated his discovery duties, the next question is whether the trial court erred in
refusing to grant any of the relief sought
by defense counsel after the violation was
brought to its attention. Rule 16(g) provides:
4. The facts of this case illustrate the value of
written requests for production and of carefully
drawn responses. Had the prosecutor drafted a
response to exclude information in other files,
the defense could not have been misled by his
nonproduction of the Moores' statements. On
the other hand, had defense counsel been informed that the prosecution would not voluntarily produce requested material, she could have
taken steps to seek an* order compelling production.
5. Before the trial court, the prosecutor argued
that he had acted in good faith with regard to
the Moores' statements. He explained that he
had assumed responsibility for the case after the
previous prosecutor was transferred and that
during discovery he had acted under the assumption that all information pertaining to the
case was in the files that were given to him.
Before this Court, the State does not explicitly
assert that the prosecutor's good faith is a defense to the claim of error.
The prosecutor's good faith should not have
had any impact on the trial court's determina-

If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to
comply with this rule, the court may
order such party to permit the discovery
or inspection, grant a continuance, or
prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such
other order as it deems just under the
circumstances.
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-16(g) (1982 ed.). Under this rule, the trial court has ample
power to obviate any prejudice resulting
from a breach of the criminal discovery
rules. If it does so, the defendant obviously cannot complain of the prosecutor's conduct, since the defendant's substantial
rights will not have been affected. See
Utah R.Crim.P. 30 (codified in U.C.A., 1953,
§ 77-35-30(a) (1982 ed.)).
On the other hand, if the trial judge
denies the relief requested under Rule
16(g), that denial may constitute an abuse
of discretion warranting a reversal. An
abuse of discretion occurs when, taking
into account any remedial measures ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to
the defendant still satisfies the standard
for reversible error set forth in Rule 30,
and the remedial measures requested but
refused would have obviated this prejudice.
tion of whether the prosecutor had violated his
discovery duties. In State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d
785 (Utah 1984), this Court stated:
At the outset, we stress that we are concerned with more than the prosecutor's state
of knowledge
Information known to police officers working on the case is charged to
the prosecution since the officers are part of
the prosecution team. Neither the prosecutor
nor officers working on a case may withhold
exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable to
a defendant.
... [T]he good or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant.
Id at 788 (citations omitted). While constitutional principles imposed the duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence in Shabata, whereas the
duty to disclose inculpatory evidence in the instant case was assumed voluntarily, the principle stated in Shabata is applicable here: information known to any part of ihe prosecution
team is charged to the prosecutor, and the prosecutor's good faith ignorance does not excuse
nondisclosure. If any weight were given to
good faith ignorance, it would only encourage
after-the-fact justifications for nondisclosure.
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In the present case, the trial court denied
all requested relief, including defendant's
motions for a continuance and for a mistrial, either of which would have mitigated
the prejudice he suffered.6 Whether the
trial court abused its discretion in denying
those motions therefore depends entirely
upon a determination of whether the prosecutor's failure to produce the requested
information resulted in prejudice sufficient
to warrant reversal under Rule 30.
Rule 30 states: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded." U.C.A., 1953, § 77-3S-30
(1982 ed.). The meaning of this standard is
not entirely clear from our cases. We have
ruled in several cases that the Rule 30
phrase "affect the substantial rights of a
party" means that an error warrants reversal "only if a review of the record persuades the court that without the error
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for the defendant.' "
State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048
(Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Hutchison,
655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1982) (emphasis
added)); see also State v. Velarde, 734
P.2d 440 (1986).T And we have applied this
rule in cases involving nondisclosures by
the prosecution. See State v. Schreuder,
6. The fact that a motion for relief under Rule
16(g) was made is significant under our decisions in State v. Workman,, 635 ?2d 49, 53
(Utah 1981) (defendant's failure to seek a continuance tends to negate claimed element of
surprise), and State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264,
275-76 (Utah 1985) (defendant's claim of prejudice was precluded in part because he did not
give the trial court an opportunity to avoid or to
mitigate the prejudice resulting from the nondisclosure).
7. We are dealing here with the outcome of trial,
not the outcome of plea bargaining. A separate
point defendant raises on appeal is that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel during
plea bargaining. He reasons that counsel could
not advise him effectively as to the wisdom of
accepting or rejecting plea bargain offers without the information that was withheld by the
prosecution.
We have previously rejected claims alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel when a defendant has rejected a plea bargain and has retained
his or her right to a fair trial. For example, in
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985),

712 P.2d 264, 275-76 (Utah 1985) (defendant failed to show a "reasonable probability" that the undisclosed evidence would
have affected the outcome of trial). In
other cases involving nondisclosure, our
statements of the standard have been less
precise. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662
(Utah 1985) (failure to disclose evidence did
not so mislead defendant as to cause prejudicial error); State v. Workman, 635 P.2d
49, 53 (Utah 1981) (surprise testimony was
without prejudicial effect). We think that
the "reasonable likelihood" standard set
forth in Fontana, Hutchison, Velarde, and
Schreuder best explains Rule 30's test for
reversible error. In light of our inconsistent expressions of this standard in the
past, we will take this opportunity to flesh
out the meaning of the phrase "reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result."
If we assume a spectrum of probabilities
with zero percent at one end representing
no likelihood of a different result and one
hundred percent at the other end representing absolute certainty of a different result,
we can array verbalizations of probabilities
across that spectrum. A "mere possibility" is at the low end of the spectrum, "near
certainty" is at the high end, and "more
probable than not" is a likelihood greater
than fifty percent. Of course, we cannot
we stated: "[Defendant] loses sight of the fact
that our state and federal constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains."
At most, the cases cited by defendant lend
indirect support to the proposition that the State
cannot enforce a defendant's guilty plea and
consequent waiver of his right to a fair trial if
he has been denied effective assistance of counsel in deciding whether to waive his rights.
North Carolina v. Atford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct.
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (individual accused
of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and
understanding^ consent to imposition of a prison sentence even if he or she is unwilling to
admit participation in the acts constituting the
crime); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
363, 98 S.Ct 663, 667, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)
(defendants advised by competent counsel are
presumptively capable of intelligent choice in
pleading guilty); see also State v. Kay, 717 P.2d
1294, 1299 (Utah 1986) (defendant must act
freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge
when he or she pleads guilty and thereby waives
important constitutional rights). In this case,
defendant did not waive his right to a fair trial
by pleading guilty as did the defendants in Alford, Bordenkircher, and Kay.
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assign a definite spot on the spectrum to certainly above the "mere possibility" point
the term "reasonable likelihood," but we on the spectrum. If it is "more probable
can give some guidance to the lower courts than not" that the outcome of trial would
and counsel as to where a "reasonable like- have been different, then a court cannot
lihood" should fall.
possibly place confidence in the verdict
Furthermore,
thoughtful reflection sugIn defining a similarly worded standard,
the United States Supreme Court has stat- gests that confidence in the outcome may
ed: "A reasonable probability is a probabil- be undermined at some point substantially
ity sufficient to undermine confidence in short of the "more probable than not" porthe outcome."8 Strickland v. Wash- tion of the spectrum. It may not be possiington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, ble to define "reasonable likelihood" much
2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Unit- more explicitly than this, but the foregoing
ed States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. should be of some assistance in deciding
3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) {Strickland whether an error requires reversal.
articulation of the reasonable probability
Applying Rule 30 to the prosecutor's viostandard applied in a case involving nondislations
of his discovery duties, we must
closure of impeachment evidence). Aldetermine
whether there is a reasonable
though the United States Supreme Court's
likelihood
that
the outcome of Knight's triinterpretation of "reasonable probability"
is not binding on this Court when constru- al would have been more favorable to him
ing state criminal rules, we are persuaded had the prosecution revealed the requested
that defining the substantively identical material. This determination normally is
term "reasonable likelihood" by reference based upon a review of the record. State
to a reviewing court's confidence in the v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah
outcome of trial makes good sense in deter- 1984). If taken literally, this review procemining whether reversible error has oc- dure would require us to determine from
curred. Rules that govern criminal pro- the record what evidence would have been
ceedings are meant to ensure that a trial is before the jury absent the error. Howa search for truth and that the verdict ever, when, as here, the error consists of
merits confidence. It is entirely consistent the prosecution's failure to provide a dewith this aim to require that when error fendant with inculpatory evidence, the
has eroded a reviewing court's confidence record does not provide much assistance in
in the outcome of a particular trial, we discovering the nature or magnitude of the
should start over and conduct a new trial. resulting prejudice to the defense. The
record cannot reveal how knowledge of this
[6] The erosion-of-confidence criterion
evidence
would have affected the actions of
gives substance to the more theoretical
defense
counsel,
either in preparing for
"reasonable likelihood" standard. It thus
trial
or
in
presenting
the case to the jury.
assists us in determining where on the
To
a
large
extent,
this
leaves the reviewing
spectrum of outcome probabilities discourt
to
speculate
whether,
absent the ercussed earlier "reasonable likelihood"
ror,
there
is
a
reasonable
likelihood
that the
might appear. For an error to require
reversal, the likelihood of a different out- defense would have adduced other evidence
come must be sufficiently high to under- which, when considered in light of the evimine confidence in the verdict This is dence actually presented, would have pro8, Language in State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187,
1205 (Utah 1984), indicates that the "reasonable
probability* standard is somewhat lower than
the "reasonable likelihood" standard; on reflection, this statement appears wrong. The words
"likelihood" and "probability," as used in these
error-measuring standards, are synonymous,
and the two standards have been used interchangeably by this Court. See State v. Pierre,
572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (Utah 1977), cert denied,

439 VS. 882, 99 S.Ct. 219, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978)
("error must be such that there exists a reasonable probability or likelihood that there would
have been a result more favorable to the defendant in absence of the error" (emphasis added)).
Compare State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048
(Utah 1984) ("reasonable likelihood" standard).
with State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 275-76
(Utah 1985) ("reasonable probability" standard).
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duced a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
[7] Because of the difficulties posed by
the record's silence in cases involving a
wrongful failure to disclose inculpatory evidence, it seems appropriate in such instances to place the burden on the State to
persuade a court that the error did not
unfairly prejudice the defense. Therefore,
when the defendant can make a credible
argument that the prosecutor's errors have
impaired the defense, it is up to the State
to persuade the court that there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the
outcome of trial would have been more
favorable for the defendant.
In the present case, the defense makes
several arguments in support of its claim
that the defense was impaired. First, because of the prosecutor's representations
before trial that he was unable to locate
the Moores and his failure to disclose the
Moores' correct addresses and telephone
numbers when he obtained them, the defense had no opportunity to contact the
Moores and had no reason to expect that
they would be present to testify. As far as
the defense knew, Richens was the main
witness against Knight and the focus of
the trial would be on Richens' credibility.
Defendant claims that this erroneous focus
profoundly influenced defense counsel's
pretrial strategy and trial preparation.
Second, even if the defense should have
expected the Moores to testify because
they were listed as possible witnesses, the
prosecutor's failure to respond fully to the
discovery request left the defense unaware
of the existence and content of the statements that the prosecution had taken from
the Moores. This, defendant contends, impaired his counsel's ability to prepare to
meet the Moores' testimony.
We cannot determine with any certainty
from the record whether, absent the prosecutor's nondisclosures, the defense would
have been better prepared to meet the
Moores' testimony. However, the contention that the defense was caught off-guard
and was denied sufficient time to explore
ways of meeting the Moores' testimony
rings true, and we certainly cannot say

that advance notice would not have led to
the introduction of other evidence that
would have undermined their statements.
Moreover, as we discuss below, the Moores'
testimony was apparently pivotal to the
jury's conviction of Knight and acquittal of
Ridlon. Given the centrality of this testimony, the possible denial of adequate opportunity to meet it assumes heightened
importance when evaluating whether the
defense might have been impaired.
[8] Having thus weighed these arguments, we conclude that defendant has
presented a credible argument that his defense was impaired. Therefore, the State
must bear the burden of persuading us
that the error was not prejudicial. It can
meet this burden by showing that despite
the errors, the outcome of trial merits confidence and there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant In State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656
(Utah 1985), for example, the prosecutor
failed to disclose that the victim had seen
the defendant near the scene of the burglary. Although the nondisclosure was error,
the State convinced this Court that the
nondisclosure did not significantly mislead
the defendant during trial preparation. Id.
at 662. This Court also was convinced that
the undisclosed evidence was not crucial to
the prosecution's case because other substantial evidence tied the defendant to the
burglary. Id.
In the present case, the State attempts to
show that the errors were not prejudicial.
Here, in contrast to Carter, we find the
State's arguments unpersuasive. The
State's first argument is based on the following facts: Sometime after Georgia
Moore talked to investigators and corroborated Knight's alibi story, the Knights and
the Moores had a falling out The two
families came into conflict while living together in a one-family house. The Moores
moved out, and when they came to pick up
their belongings, certain items—guns, a microwave, welding equipment, and tools—
were missing. The Moores accused defendant Johnnie Knight of stealing these
things. The conflict escalated, and Georgia
Moore wrote a letter to Knight in which
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she stated: "You not only steal from
friends, you continue to screw them time
after time. John, Kenny's back at the
pointp9*] You'll be seeing him soon. Say
hi for me." Following this conflict, Georgia Moore was listed as one of the State's
witnesses.
Based on these facts, the State argues
that the defense could not have been genuinely surprised that Georgia Moore no longer intended to corroborate Knight's alibi
story. The State's argument can be restated in this way: Defense counsel had
ample opportunity to consult with Knight
concerning the fact that he had asked Georgia Moore to provide him with an alibi and
to lie to investigators, and defense counsel
could not have expected Georgia Moore to
continue to lie for Knight after the dispute,
especially when she was listed as a witness
for the State.
We find this argument unpersuasive b e
cause it presumes that Georgia Moore's
testimony at trial was true. If Georgia
Moore concocted the events described in
her testimony to hurt Knight, then—absent
disclosure of her statement—the defense
had no way of knowing what she would say
and could not prepare to meet it. In addition, the defense may have supposed that
the State was listing Georgia Moore as a
possible credibility or character witness (in
case Knight took the stand) and that she
would testify as to the events surrounding
the dispute between the families.

the defense had seen the Moores' statements before trial and had prepared to
discredit the specific allegations in the
statements. We cannot presume that the
events at trial would have been unaffected.
For example, if evidence had been obtained demonstrating that Walter Moore
was out of town on the day of the robbery,
this evidence would have entirely discredited his testimony. But if defendant had
no pretrial indication as to the nature of
Walter Moore's testimony, then there was
no reason for defendant to attempt to locate such evidence. Since defense counsel
only had one evening and a lunch break to
prepare to meet the Moores' testimony, we
are not persuaded that the defense was as
effective as it would have been if defense
counsel had been granted a continuance to
meet the undisclosed evidence.
The State's third argument is based on
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985).
The State contends that even if the Moores'
testimony was a surprise, defendant was
not significantly prejudiced by it because
other substantial testimony tied defendant
to the robbery. Specifically, the State relies on the facts that an accomplice's testimony implicated Knight and that Knight's
billfold was found in the trunk of the car.
We disagree.
The Moores' testimony was crucial to the
prosecution's case. Richens testified that
he, Ridlon, and Knight committed the robbery, thereby equally implicating the two
co-defendants in the crime. Evidently, Richens' testimony alone was insufficient to
convince the jury of the co-defendants'
guilt, because Ridlon was acquitted. The
State introduced additional evidence
against Knight, and Knight was convicted.

[9] The State's second argument is that
Knight was not prejudiced because defense
counsel was prepared to meet the testimony of the Moores. For this proposition, the
State relies upon the fact that defense
counsel did cross-examine the Moores vigorously and attempted to show that they
had a motive to lie because of the earlier
disagreement between the Moores and
Knight The fact that defense counsel conducted vigorous cross-examination is not
proof that she was fully prepared to meet
the Moores' testimony. We do not know
what additional impeachment evidence
might have been submitted to the jury if

The first piece of additional evidence
against Knight was the fact that his wallet
was found in the trunk of the getaway car,
along with some tools, clothing, and animal
traps. It is unlikely that Knight would
have been convicted if the wallet had been
the only evidence against him other than
Richens' testimony. Richens testified that

9. The term "the point" is short for "the point of
the mountain," a term which is used to refer to

a gap in the Traverse Mountains near which the
Utah State Prison is located.
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before the date of the robbery, he and
Knight had gone trapping together on several occasions and left their wallets in the
car while trapping.
The other additional evidence against
Knight was the testimony of the Moores.
If the jury believed Georgia Moore's testimony, then Knight, by setting up an alibi,
was trying to hide the truth about his
actions during the time of the robbery. If
Walter Moore's testimony was believed by
the jury, then Knight was with Richens and
the getaway car shortly after the time of
the robbery. This testimony corroborated
Richens' testimony and tied Knight to the
crime.
In addition, the Moores' testimony
brought another force into play against
Knight. As a result of the Moores' testimony at trial, counsel for his co-defendant,
Ridlon, decided to change his theory of the
case. Halfway through the trial, Ridlon's
counsel informed Knight's counsel that in
his closing argument he would attempt to
persuade the jury that Richens and Knight
robbed the cleaners and that a woman was
driving the car, a woman whom Richens
was trying to protect by implicating Ridlon.10 During closing argument, Ridlon's
counsel argued this theory to the jury and,
in doing so, emphasized the evidence other
than Richens' testimony tying Knight to
10. The prejudice to defendant's pretrial strategy
has already been mentioned. Knight's counsel
argues that if the statements had been disclosed
when requested, she would not have been surprised by co-defendant's changed strategy and
would have moved for a severance five days in
advance of trial, as required by Rule 9(d) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953,
§ 77-35-9(d) (1982 ed.). It docs appear that the
prejudice to Knight resulting from co-defendant's argument that Knight was a guilty party

the crime, particularly the Moores* testimony.
[10] It is apparent that the Moores' testimony was pivotal in Knight's conviction.
The State cannot argue that the Moores
were unimportant witnesses or that their
testimony was not crucial to the prosecution's case against Knight. Given co-defendant Ridlon's acquittal, there is a high
likelihood that Knight would not have been
convicted in the absence of the Moores'
testimony.
Because the State has failed to persuade
us that the defense was not prejudiced by
its nondisclosure of the inculpatory evidence, we conclude that absent the prosecutor's errors, there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable result for defendant
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a
continuance or mistrial.11 The conviction is
reversed.
HALL, CJ., STEWART, A.CJ., and
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ„ concur.
(o
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could have been avoided by separate trials.
However, we need not reach the issue of whether it would have been error for the trial court to
deny a motion for severance. The issue will not
be raised on remand because co-defendant Ridlon was acquitted.
11. The remaining issues raised by defendant are
of no merit.
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of Divorce and Orders," dated February 5,
1988, was a final order, for purposes of filing
an appeal. We do not agree. The Consolidated
Decree of Divorce and Orders merely reiterated what the court had previously ordered in
several different orders, referred to those
orders specifically by date in most instances,
and joined them in one document, as appellant requested. We find that such an order
cannot be used to extend the time for appeal,
because it does not resolve any issue extant,
but merely refers to prior orders of the court.
Thus, the Consolidated Decree of Divorce and
Orders does not constitute an appealable final
order.
A related issue is whether appellant's
"Objection to Order" suspended the finality of
the December 31 judgment under R. Utah Ct.
App. 4(b). The objection, filed January 15,
1988, does not state .the rule under which it is
filed. Assuming that the objection was intended to be filed under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(b),
to amend or make additional findings of fact,
it was not filed within ten days after entry of
judgment, as is required by Rule 52(b). Thus,
appellant's "Objection to Order" does not
qualify as a post-judgment order which will
suspend the finality of the December 31, 1987
judgment under R. Utah Ct. App. 4(b). See
Burgers v. Maibcn, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah
1982) (An untimely motion for a new trial
does not affect the running of time for filing a
notice of appeal). The notice of appeal, filed
on March 4, 1988, was not filed within thirty
days of entry of the December 31, 1987 judgment. Therefore, we dismiss appellant's
appeal as untimely.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
I CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
ORME, Judge (dissenting):
The procedural history of this case leaves
much to be desired, due mostly to an illfated attempt to substitute an unrecorded
conference in chambers for the evidentiary
hearing which should have been held to
resolve several disputed property issues. Prolonged effort then had to be given in subsequent proceedings to reconstructing what actually transpired during that conference.
Matters were not helped by withdrawals of
counsel and the retirement of the initial judge,
whose successor was left to complete the case
without the benefit of a full record of what
had transpired before.
Like my colleagues, I am perplexed at the
entry of the consolidated decree. I am not sure
this decree served any real purpose, or was
even proper. It is, however, the final order
entered in this case, for the apparent purpose
of wrapping up loose ends and setting forth
the trial court's final judgment. The decree is

stamped as a judgment and it was docketed as
a judgment. I would not look behind it for
purposes of determining the timeliness of this
appeal. I would take the judgment at face
value, regard the appeal as timely, and reach
the merits.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's
revocation of his probation. He claims that his
probation term automatically terminated after
eighteen months by operation of law pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp.
1986).l We agree and reverse.
Defendant pleaded guilty, on September 18,
19&S, to two third de.gr.ee Celotiy, charges of
uttering a forged prescription under Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1985). On
March 20, 1986, he was sentenced to two
indeterminate sentences of zero to five years at
the Utah State Prison. The trial court suspended the prison term and placed defendant on
supervised probation for a term of three years.
Defendant completed the first eighteen
months of probation without incident.
However, on March 25, 1988, he was arrested
for violating the terms of his probation by
allegedly committing credit card fraud and for
driving under the influence. On April 12,
1988, the trial court ordered defendant to
appear before the court and show cause why
his probation should not be revoked. Defendant filed a motion to terminate probation
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\nc pro tunc. The court denied the motion,
voked defendant's probation and imposed
c original two consecutive sentences of zero
five years.
Defendant argues on appeal that section 77l-l(10)(a) mandated that his probation be
rminated after eighteen months of incidentee probation. The state argues that it is
ithin the trial court's discretion to sentence
rfendant to two consecutive terms of probion and that defendant waived his right to
rmination of probation by expressly requeing a three-year term of probation in lieu
fa prison sentence.
Section 77-18-1 (10)(a) provided that
[u]pon completion without violation of 18
lonths probation in felony or class A misdeleanor cases, ... the offender shall be termiated from sentence, unless the person is
arlier terminated by the court." In State v.
Ircen, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah
upreme Court held that the term "shall" was
strong legislative mandate that required
robation to terminate after eighteen months.
This strong mandate is not consistent with
he State's position that the eighteen-month
erm is 'tolled' when any violation occurs
/ithin the period and that there is no time
imit for initiating a revocation action." Id. at
{64. In response to the state's concerns regading violation of the public's trust, the court
xeld that "all but technical violations can be
junished on their own merits and the defendant's past record can be considered at that
ime." Id. at 465.
Furthermore, the court held that the power
:o revoke probation must be exercised within
legislatively established limits.
[W]e reaffirm that judges may
exercise sentencing discretion within
those limits established by the legislature; the power to fix sentencing
limits and the power to suspend
sentence in favor of probation are
not inherent in the judiciary but
must be authorized by statute.
Id. at 464.
At the time this matter arose, section 77-18l(10)(c) provided the terms for extending
probation.
At any time prior to the termination
of probation the court may, after a
hearing with proper notice, upon its
own motion or the motion of the
prosecutor, extend probation for
good cause shown,- for one additional term of 18 months in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases or six
months in class B misdemeanor
cases. The reasons for the extension
of the probation period shall be
made a part of the court record.

2

(Emphasis added.) Defendant served eighteen
months of incident-free probation. It was
after this term of eighteen months that the
court held a hearing and determined that
defendant's probation should be revoked.
After reviewing the record, it appears that
the trial court may have intended to sentence
defendant to two consecutive terms of probation lasting eighteen months each. At the
hearing on the motion to terminate defendant's probation, held approximately two
years after the probation order went into
effect, the court stated "[t]he eighteen months
probation was imposed on each felony to run
consecutively." However, neither the verbal
nor the written judgment made any mention
of two consecutive terms. Rather, the order
unequivocally stated: "IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that the Defendant, Leon Earl
Denney, be placed on probation for a period
of three (3) years from and after March 20,
1986."
An unambiguous order made in a criminal
proceeding cannot be varied by remarks made
in a later hearing to coincide with what the
judge may have intended, "Where the language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous,
it must be given effect as it is written ...." Stare
v. Garcia, 99 N.M. App. 466, 659 P.2d
918, 923 (1983). It is necessary that sentences
be rendered with clarity and accuracy in order
to avoid the possibility of confusion and injustice. Chase v. State, 479 P.2d 337, 339
(Alaska 1971).
Broad and uniform recognition has
been given to the precept that a
sentence imposed by a court acting
in a criminal case should be definite, unequivocal and unambiguous,
so that both the defendant and the
officials charged with executing the
sentence will be fairly apprised of
the intentions of the court.
Id. (footnote omitted). This principle was first
articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S.
360, 363 (1926), where the Court held that
"(sjentences in criminal cases should reveal
with fair certainty the intent of the court and
exclude any serious misapprehensions by those
who must execute them." However, "where
the meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and
other documents of record may be reviewed
for purposes of construing the meaning of the
judgment." Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923.
The order, as written and pronounced,
sentenced the defendant to three years of
probation. The judge did not state in his order
that the term of three years was actually two
consecutive terms of eighteen months each.3
Although, the judge may have intended the
terms to run consecutively, we do not examine
his intent where the written order is unequiv-

Ward v. Richfield City

58

UP Utah Adv Rep 58

Because the term of probation automatically
terminated after eighteen months, we do not
reach the merits of the waiver and estoppel
argument.
The judgment is reversed with directions to
grant the motion nunc pro tunc terminating
probation.
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. Utah Code Ann §77-18-1 was amended in
1985 and 1987 See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 229, §1,
1987 Utah Laws ch 114, §1 The provision defendant relies upon in this appeal is currently found in
Utah Code Ann §77-18-l(7)(a)(Supp 1988)
2. This section now reads
At any time prior to the termination of
probation, upon a minimum of five
days' notice and a hearing or upon a
waiver of the notice and hearing by the
probationer, the court may extend probation for an additional term of 18
months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are
owing.
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-l(7)(c)(Supp. 1988).
3. We do not reach the merits of whether the judge
may sentence a defendant to two consecutive terms
of probation under Utah Code Ann §76-3201(1) (Supp 1988).
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OPINION
DAVIDSON, Judge:
This appeal concerns whether

appellant,

CODE•CO
PTOVQ Utah

Boyd Ward, was properly dismissed as Richfield City Chief of Police Ward claimed
below that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act was violated, that the Richfield City
Council disregarded a temporary restraining
order by taking further subsequent action to
dismiss him as Chief of Police, and that his
request for an administrative appeal was
improperly denied. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of Richfield City
We affirm
FACTS
On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council
held a public meeting after publishing an
agenda as required by Utah Code Ann §524-6 (1981). The agenda did not list Ward's
discharge as Chief of Police Following discussion of items on the agenda, the Council
voted to hold a closed meeting and invited
Ward to join them in discussing his position as
Chief of Police The Council was concerned
about several recent resignations within the
police department. Discussion of Ward's termination ensued and the Council decided to
terminate Ward. The Council resumed open
session and formally voted to discharge Ward
effective April 3,1981.
On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written
request to the Council for an administrative
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§103-1105 and-1106 (1981). The request was
denied. On June 5, 1981, the Council published notice that a special meeting would be
held on June 8, 1981, to ratify its actions
taken at the April meeting. The Council published an agenda that included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion. Prior to the
meeting. Ward served the Council with a
temporary restraining order, to restrain it
from taking any further action against him.
Despite the temporary restraining order, the
Council ratified its decision to terminate
Ward.
On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a
preliminary injunction hearing and determined
that pursuant to the removal statute for chiefs
of police, Utah Code Ann. §10-3-911
(repealed 1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear
the matter. Section 10-3-911 stated in part
that *[t]he chief of police or fire department
of the cities may at any time be removed,
without a trial, hearing or opportunity to be
heard, by the board of commissioners whenever in its opinion the good of the service will
be served thereby."
Ward appealed the trial court's decision to
the Utah Supreme Court and the court decided
in Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P 2d 265 (Utah
1984), that the trial court did have jurisdiction
because section 10-3-911 did not pertain to
third class cities. The case was remanded to
the trial court. On remand, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Richfield City The court ruled that although the
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